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The debate about strongerenforcement of patents on intellectual
property  rights assumes that the  technological needs of the North
and the South are similar. What happens to the debate when we
allow for different technological preferences in the North and in
the South?
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dPlc,Planning,  and Researcll
Debt  and  International  Flnar"
At the heart of the debate about intelectual  competition between two firms; and gradations
property rights (IPRs) that is consuming so  of patent protection.  It assumes that both
much attention in the Uruguay Round of trade  markets arc segmented, due to different patent-
negotiations is one basic economic issue.  Most  law application in the two regions.
patented products or processes that make it to
Southern markets are developed in the North.  It  Some of the usual free-rider considerations
is therefore believed that the North would profit  muist  be qualified if the analyst considers the
from tighter paten. procedures in the South, to  possibility that patent laws in the two regions
protect Northem firns from imitators in their  affect both the quantity and quality of innova-
export markets - and that the South would like  tion.  This becomes importar" when the two
to pay as little as possible for these innovations,  regions have different technological needs.
which lax patent procedures allows.  It is recog-
nized that this reduces the incentive for R&D in  What are the results of the analysis?  First,
the North, but as long as the South . a small  an increase in patent protection in either region
part of the market, free riding does little harn.  leads to an increase in innovative activity, as
well as a greater fit between the available
In this paper, Diwan and Rodrik bring  technologies and the preferences of the patenting
another feature to the debate: the possibility that  region.  By implication, this skews the technol-
the North and South may have differing techno-  ogy range away from the needs of the othe
logical needs.  Just as the North would like to  region.
develop drugs against cancer and heart disease,
and the South drugs against tropical disease, so  Second, although a strictly utilitarian global
the North's  labor-saving innovations are less  welfare function would assign identical rates of
useful in the South, where labor is cheap.  patent protection to the North and South, placing
Southern patents might promote the develop-  greater weight on the welfare of the South
ment of technologies appropriate to the South  necessitates differential treatment. But it is not
that might not have been developed if there were  clear a priori whether the South ought to have a
no patents.  In this case, lower patent protection  lower or higher level of protection than the
in the South would not benefit the South - and  North.
increased patent protection in the South can hurt
the North when the resources that go into R&D  Third, when patent rules are set in an
are limited.  uncoordinated manner, it is possible that a
narrowing of the gap between the technological
Diwan and Rodrik develop a formnal  model  preferences of the two regions will lead to lower
for IPRs, emphasizing the dimension of techno-  rates of patent protection in both the North and
logical choice.  This model allows for a contin-  the South.  Similarly, an increase in the relative
uum of potential technologies, with a range of  market size of the South can lead to a reduction
preferences in the North and South; free entry  in patent protection in both regions.
into the R&D sector rather than duopolistic
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We  thank  Stanley  Fischer  for  asking  the  question,  and  Refik
Erzan  for  stimulating  our  thinking  cn  the  subject.I. Introductio
One of the  contentious  North-South  issues  under  discussion  in  the  current
rou..1  of GATT  negotiations  concerns  the  protection  of intellectual  property
rights  (IPRs). The  U.S.,  European  Community,  and  Japan  are in  broad  agreement
that  the  international  trading  system  provides  inadequate  protection  to  IPRs,
and  have  put  forth  a  number  of  proposals  to tighten  restrictions;  poorer
countries,  whose  practices  would  be most immediately  affected,  oppose  these
proposals  on the  grounds  that  they  would  increase  the  profits  of  monopolistic
foreign  firms  at the  expense  of  domestic  consumers.
Under  the  present  regime,  IPRs  are largely  beyond  the  scope  of the  GATT,
and  fall  under  the  jurisdiction  of the  World  Intellectual  Property
Organization  (WIPO),  a  U.N. agency. It is  WIPO that  oversees  the  existing
international  agreements  on IPRs  such  as the  Paris  Convention  (on  patents)  and
the  Berne  Convention  (on  copyrights).  The  Paris  Convention  requires  member
states,  under  the  national  treatment  principle,  to apply  the  same  criteria  to
foreign  firms  as to  domestic  ones,  but does  not  prescribe  specific  levels  of
patent  protection.  Most  of the  ninety-eight  members  of the  Convention  are in
fact  developing  countries. But  the  developed  countries  argue  that  the
prevailing  practices  in the  South  leave  much to  be desired. Among  complaints
voiced  by the  former  are:  selective  sectoral  coverage  in  national  legislation;
inadequate  remedies  and  sanctions  in  case  of infringement  of IPRs;  procedural
and  administrative  difficulties  impeding  access  to courts;  and  arbitrariness
and  discrimination  in  the  application  of domestic  statutes. Developing
countries  like  Brazil  and India  in turn  stress  the  possible  exacerbation  of
monopolistic  practices  by Northern  firms  were  patent  protection  to  become  more
stringent. Therefore,  they  resist  GATT  involvement  in  IPRs,  and  prefer  to  use
WIPO,  whichi  lacks  enforcement  power,  as the  forum  for  discussion  of such-2-
issues.'
The  basic  economic  issue  that  underlies  the  conflict  of interest  is  easy
to see. 2 Most  patented  products  or processes  that  make  it to  Southern  markets
are  developed  in  the  North. The  North  would  therefore  profit  from  tighter
patent  procedures  in  the  South,  as this  would  protect  Northern  firms  against
imitators  in their  export  markets. According  to the  U.S. International  Trade
Commission,  U.S.  firms  lose  around  $8  billion  annually  from  patent  and
copyright  infringements  (cited  in  Baldwin,  1988). But  by the  same  token,  the
South  would  like  to  pay  as little  as possible  for  these  innovations,  which  is
what lax  patent  protection  achieves. To  be sure,  this  in turn  reduces  the
incentives  of Northern  firms  to invest  in  R6D.  As long  as the  South  is  a
small  part  of the  world  market,  however,  the  adverse  effects  of its  policies
on global  innovative  activity  are  also small,  and  free  riding  on the  North
makes  eminently  good  sense. As a recent  paper  by Chin  and  Grossman  (1988)
demonstrates,  it  may  be in the  South's  interest  to  provide  no patent
protection  whatsoever.
In  this  paper  we analyze  this  conflict  of interest  by bringing  into
consideration  another  feature  of some  importance.  This  new  feature  consists
of the  possibility  that  the  North  and  South  may  have  differing  technological
needs:  the  North  would  like  to  develop  drugs  against  cancer  and  heart  disease,
whereas  the  South  benefits  more  from  drugs  against  tropical  diseases;  labor  is
cheap  in  the  South  but  expensive  in the  North,  so the  Notth's  labor-saving
innovations  are less  useful  in the  South. When  R&D  resources  that  can  be
1.  This  discussion  is  drawn  from  various  GATT  sources. See  also  Baldwin
(1988),  Benko  (1988),  Hamilton  and  Whalley  (1988),  pp.  28-29,  and  Kelly  et al.
(1988),  p. 39.
2.  For  an early  statement  of the  issues,  see  Penrose  (1951),  especially
chaps.  VII  and  X.-3-
deployed  in support  of these  innovations  are  limited,  choices  have to  be made
as to  which  areas  will  receive  greater  emphasis. Now  Southern  patents  may
have a role  to  play in  promoting  the  development  of technologies  appropriate
to the  South  that  would  not  have  been developed  in the  absence  of these
patents.3 This  incentive  now  competes  against  the  free-riding  motive. As we
shall  see,  one implication  is that  a  benevolent  global  ?lanner  who  puts  a
greater  weight  on the  South's  welfare  than  on the  North's  would  no longer
necessarily  allow  lower  patent  protection  in the  South. Another  implication
of the  potential  competition  for  suitable  technologies  is  that  increased
patent  protection  in the  South  need  not  always  be good  for  the  North.
The only  other  formal  model  devoted  to IPRs  in the  North-South  context
that  we are  aware  of is the  one  by Chin  and  Grossman  (1988). These  authors
consider  the  competition  between  two  firms,  one  each  form  the  North  and  South.
The Northern  firm  can  invest  in  process  innovation,  which  the  Southern  firm
can  copy  costlessly  when the  South  provides  no  patent  protection.  Our
framework  differs  from  theirs  in  a  number  of respects. We allow  for  a
continuum  of  potential  technologies,  with  a different  distribution  of
preferences  over  them  in the  two  regions. This  framework  can  be interpreted
in terms  of product,  as  well  as process,  innovation.  Second,  our  model  has
free  entry  into  the  R&D  sector,  rather  than  duopolistic  competition  between
two  firms. Third,  we allow  gradations  of patent  protection,  which  is  more
general  than  the  simple  binary  choice  (protection  or no  protection)  analyzed
by Chin  and  Grossman. Finally,  we assume  that  the  Northern  and  Southern
3.  This point was recognized early on by Vernon (1957,  p. 12): "...  there is
a case  to  be made that  inventors  in the  industrialized  areas  of the  world  may
need  some  special  incentive  to  concentrate  their  talents  on products  of
special  utility  to the  underdeveloped  areas."-4-
markets  are  segmented,  due  to differential  patent-law  application  in  the  two
regions. All  of these  features  appear  to  be desirable  ones. Their  cost  is
that,  unlike  Chin  and  Grossman,  we do not  get  into  the  details  of the
strategic  interactions  between  Northern  and  Southern  firms  competing  in
oligopolistic  markets.
II.  Preliminaries
We allow  for  an unlimited  spectrum  of potential  technologies,  indexed  by
the continuous  variable 0 e  (-,  ).  The range of discovered technologies,
characterired  by a lower  bound  L and  an  upper  bound  0, is  endogenous  and
denoted  by [0,  7].  We limit  the  analysis  to  uninterrupted  ranges  (i.e.  no
"holes"  are  allowed  in  the  range).
Consumers  are  differentiated  by taste,  with  each  having  a  preferred
variety  of technology. 4 Consumers  can  therefore  also  be indexed  by their
preferred  9. To keep  things  simple,  we assume  each  consumer  gets  utility  of 1
if  his  prefered  technology  is  available,  and  0  otherwise. Letting  u(9)  stand
for  the  utility  of consumer  with  preferred  technology  0,  we have:
{  1  if a  s a  ,
(1)  u(9)  -
0  otherwise.
Northern  c-nsumers  are  distributed  according  to  the  continuous  distribution
function  B(0)  with  support  (-x, ).  Aggregate  consumer  welfare  in  the  North
4.  The  use  of the  term  "consumer"  here  is  perfectly  general,  and  applies
equally  well to  producers  who are  downstream  users  of technology. If  we
interpret  the  set  of technologies  as pertaining  to  a particular  economic
activity,  0 could  measure  the  required  capital-labor  ratio,  the  level  of
skilled  labor  needed,  the  expected  life  of the  equipment,  and  so forth. Or,  a
could  simply  index  different  products.-5-
can then  be written  as a function  of the  range  of  discovered  technologies:
(2)  Un(,  O)  - J  u(O)B(O)dO  - fB(O)dO.
where  we have  used (1). For  the  moment,  t.othing  specific  need  be assumed
about  the  shape  of B(.). But  it  will  help to  think  of  B(.)  as a single-
peaked,  symmetric  distribution  such  as the  normal.
Consumers  in the  South  are  parameterized  in  same  manner,  except  that  we
assume  the  distribution  function  for  Southern  consumers  is  centered  on a  mean
to the  right  of that  of the  North. Further,  the  mass  of Southern  customers  is
a fraction  y  of those  in  North  (7y<l),  with - measuring  the  relative  market
share  of the  two  regions. This  allows  us to  write  the  distribution  function
B,(8)  for  the  South  as a simple  transformation  of that  of the  North.
Bs  (O)  - 7B(O - S).
Aggregate  consumer  welfare  in  the  South  is then  given  by
(3) Us(Q,  6)  - f B(d-S)dO.
We assume  that  all  innovations  take  place  in  the  North. This is  not
terribly  restrictive  provided  that  the  North  has  a sufficiently  strong
comparative  advantage  in  research  and  development  or that  the  South  can
appropriately  discriminate  between  domestic  and  foreign  firms  in the
application  of its  patent  laws. As  both of these  are  realistic  features  of
the  current  regime,  we can  concentrate  on the  decisions  of Northern  firms
alone. We assume  that  there  is  an infinite  supply  of  potential  innovating
firms,  with  each  existing  firm  identified  by the  technology  it  has  developed.
There  is  a fixed  cost  c required  to develop  each  technology;  marginal  costs  of-6-
production  will  not  play %n  interesting  role  for  innovating  firms,  so  we  will
ignore  them. These  fixed  costs  are  treated  parametrically  by the  firms,  even
though  an expansion  of the  range  [,Q,  e]  tends  to  drive  c up as the  costs  of
resources  used in  the  innovation  process  are  bid  up.  So  we will  write  c  -
c(9 - L),  with  c'>0  and  c''>O. This  "congestion"  effect  acts  like  an
externality,  and  will  play  an important  role  in  the  anelysis. Its  purpose  is
to  capture  the  reality  that  the  resources  used  in  R&D  are  not  in  perfectly
elastic  supply.
Consider  the  pricing  strategy  of a firm  which  has  developed  and  patented
a certain  technology.  If patent  protection  were  perfect,  the  firm  could
capture  the  entire  consumer  surplus  by charging  a price  of  unity  (technically,
unity  minus  epsilon). Since  patent  protection  never  provides  for  full
monopoly, 5 it is  preferable  to  work  with  a model  in  which  the  firm  can  capture
only  a fraction  of consumer  surplus  and  charges  a price  lower  than  u.aity.  A
simple  way to link  the  patent  laws  to tl-  pricing  behavior  of firms  is  as
follows. Suppose  the  innovator  faces  a large  fringe  of potential  imitators  in
the  North,  each  of  which  can  mimic  the  former  by incurring  unit  costs  of  oCl
and  no fixed  costs. The  parameter  a  can  be thought  of in  part  as capturing
the (expected)  unit  costs  incurred  by imitators  if  they  are  brought  to  court
and  successfully  prosecuted.  In this  sense,  a  parameterizes  the
restrictiveness  of the  prevailing  patent  laws  in the  North,  with  higher  a
associated  with  more  complete  patent  protection.  The  analogous  role  in the
South  is  played  by the  parameter  8.  Since  the  innovator's  marginal  costs  are
assume%d  zero (or,  less  restrictively,  lower  than  the  imitators),  he will
5.  In  practice,  even  full  patent  righcs  are likely  to  confer  only  limited
protection  against  imitators  and  fail  to internalize  R&D spillovers.  See
Dasgupta  (1988)  and  Jaffe  (1986).-7-
always  have the  incentive  to  charge  the  limit-prices  a  c [0,  1) and  8  e [0,  1)
in the  the  two  regions,  respectively.6  Hence  the  market  equilibrium  is
similar  to that  with contestable  markets:  for  each  technology  in the  produced
range,  the  incumbent  firm  (the  innovator)  charges  the  price  which  equals  the
unit  cost  of potential  entrants. The  costs  of potential  imitators  are  in turn
determined  by the  restrictiveness  of  prevailing  patent  laws.
Tozal  Northern  profits  can  then  be written  as:
(4)  I(Q,  T)  f  [aB(9)  +  # 7 B(9-S)]dO  - [0 - Q]c(.).
We assume  that  entry  into  new  technologies,  as  opposed  to already  developed
ones,  is  free.  Firms  enter  until  revenues  just  cover  fixed  costs. This
allows  us to determine  the  range  of existing  technologies  by imposing  the
following  zero-profit  conditions.
(5)  aB(O) +  P7B(O-S) - c(0 - 0) - 0,
(6)  aB(9) + P7B(T-S) - c(0  - Q) _ 0,
which  must  hold  at the  edges  of the  range  (see  Figure  1).  Provided  B(0)  is
single-peaked  and  not  truncated,  (5)  and (6)  together  determine  the  range  [0,
7]  of technologies  which  firms  will  find  in their  interest  to  develop. We
assume  that  S  or '  are  small  enough  to  ensure  that  the  range  of profitable
technologies  is indeed  a continuous  one. Notice  that  as long  as  P>0,  the
6.  Notice  the  implication  that  firms  can  charge  different  prices  in  different
regions. This  requires  that  Southern  imitators  not  be able to  market  their
output  in the  North. The  justification  is  that  patent  restrictions  apply  to
all sales  within  a region,  irrespective  of  whether  they  originate  from  home  or
foreign  firms. This  is  consistent  with  the  Paris  Convention.  Furthei,  in the
U.S.,  importation  of a  product  that  uses  a domestically-patented  process  is
forbidden.presence  of the  South  allpws  the  North  to exploit  a  wider  range  of
technologies,  as fixed  costs  can  be spread  on a larger  base.  For  the  same
reason,  Northern  firms  will  always  market  their  products  in the  South,  even  if
the  degree  of patent  protection  there  is  substantially  lower  than in  their
home  market.
Social  welfare  in  the  North  is the  sum  of consumer  benefits  and  profits,
and  can  be stated  as a function  of the  range  of  discovered  technologies:
(7)  Wn(i,  O)  - f(B(e)  + PB(e-S)]de - [5  -
The  corresponding  expression  for  the  South  is:
(8)  W3(Q,  O)  - |(l-P)BS(O)dO  - j  (l1-)B(9-S)de.
Note  that  07fB(O-S)d5  represents  '.he  transfer  of r-ofits  from  the  South  to the
North  and  is therefore  subtracted  from  Southern  welfare.
III.  Comparative  Statics  for  the  Range  of Technologies
The  policy  instruments  in this  model  are  a  and  P,  which  parameterize  the
degree  of patent  protection  provided  in the  two  regions. They  affect  the
levels  of  welfare  in the  Nortn  and  South  through  their  influence  on the  range
of innovations,  and,  in the  case  of 0,  through  the  magnitude  of the  profit
transfers  from  the  South  to the  North. We sPart  by analyzing  the  response  of
e  and  O to changes  in  exogenous  parameters.
We first  note that  equations  (5)  and  (6)  yield  a relationship  between
marginal  benefits  in the  two  regions:
(9)  [B(Q) - B(O)] - 7(fi/a)[B(6-S)  - B(Q-S)].-9-
The  expressions  in the  square  brackets  capture  the  difference  between  marginal
consumer  benefits  at the  edges  of the  range  for  the  two  regions. Suppose  that
the  South  did  not  exist  (-y-O),  that  it  did  ;iot  provide  any  patent  protection
(P-0),  or that  its  tastes  %are identical  to  the  North's  (S-C). Then (9)  would
require  equality  between  B(8)  and  B(7). This  equates  the  marginal  consumer
benefits  (in  the  North)  at each  end  of the  range. When  the  South  enters  the
picture,  however,  this  equality  need  no longer  hold;  as  we shall  see,  the
range  of produced  innovations  be-omes  skewe away  from  Northern  tastes  and
towards  Southern  tastes. The larger  is the  Southern  market  (y),  the  taste
differential  (S),  and  the  relative  level  of Southern  patent  protection  (a/a),
the  more  pronounced  this  becomes.
As a final  preliminary,  a note  is  warranted  regarding  the  sign  of the
partial  derivative  of the  benefit  function  B(.),  as this  plays  an important
role  in the  following  analysis. With  a symmetric,  single-peaked  distribution
function,  B'(0)  is  positive  or  negative  depending  on  which  side  of the  mean a
lies. We will  henceforth  assume  that  5  and (0-S)  will  always  lie  to the
right,  and  Q.  and (0-S)  always  to  the  left,  of the  mean  of B(0).7 This  ensures
that
B' (O)  < O,  B'(0-S)  < O,  B'  (L)  > O.  B'(0-S)  > O.
An interpretation  of these  conditions  in  economic  terms  is  that  the  marginal
benefit  from  innovations  falls  as the  range  of innovations  becomes  broader.
They  will  always  hold for  a distribution  like  the  normal  one,  provided  S is
not  too  large.
(i)  Effects  of Increased  Northern  Patent  Protection.  We differentiate
7.  This  is in fact  too  restrictive  for  the  results  to  be discussed  below  to
hold. A weaker  condition  will generally  suffice..10-
(5)-(6)  totally  to  perform  comparative-statics  analysis. Let  the  determinant
of the  system  be denoted  by a  <  0 (see  the  appendix). Then  the  effect  of
changes  in  a  on the  boundaries  of the  range  of innovations  can  be determined
as follows:
(10)  dU/da - (l/A)(-B(8)[aB'(7)  +  P7B'(i-S)]  +  [B(O) - B(7)]c') < 0.
(  _)  ()  (-)  (0/+)
As discussed  above,  B'(O)  and  B'(O-S)  are  both  be negative. Moreover,  we
will see  that  B(Q)  - B(7)]  Z  0 (i.e.  the  range  will  be generally  skewed  to
the  right). These  ensure  that  an increase  in  patent  protection  in the  North
will  unambiguously  reduce  the  lower  bound,  increasing  the  number  of
innovations  on the  left  of the  distribution.  These  are  the  innovations  which
are  not  greatly  valued  in the  South.
Some  ambiguity  exists,  however,  with  the  upper  bound:
(11)  dG/da - (l/A)(-B(9)[aB'(V)  +  PvB'(8-S)]  +  [B(P) - B(O)]c'),
(  ) (  )  ~(+)  (0/+)
which  is  2ositive  only  if [B(Q)  - B(O)]c'  is  not too  large. The
interpretation  is  as follows. If the  range  of innovations  is  already  too
skewed  to the  right  (i.e.  towards  Southern  tastes)  so that [B(O)  - B(O)]  >>
0, an increase  in  Northern  patent  protection  may  well  lead  to  some  of the
innovations  that  are  relatively  more  suitable  to the  South  to drop  out. This
possibility  is  due  to the  crowding-out  of existing  products  as the  expansion
of the  range  of innovative  activity  increases  costs  incurred  by all
incumbents.  When  this  does  not  happen,  an increase  in  a will  generate  more
innovation  on the  upper  end  of the  range  as  well.-11-
Further,  combining  expressions  (10)  and (11).  it  can  be seen  that  the
overall  range  of innovations  unambiguously  expands  as  a  increases:
(12)  d9/da - d./da
- (l/A)(B(i)[aB'()  +  fyB'(Q-S)]  - B(f)[aB'(V)  + 0B'(V-S)])  >  0.
Therefore,  patent  protection  in the  North  will  increase  innovative  activity,
but  may  do so at the  expense  of some  products  which  are  particularly  suited  to
Southern  requirements.
(ii)  Effects  of Increased  Southern  Patent  Protection.  The  effects  of
patent  protection  in  the  South  are  similar  to those  discussed  above,  except
that  they  get  moderated  by the  parameter  1.  Hence,  an increase  in  e
unambiguously  increases  the  innovations  that  are  more  appropriate  to Southern
needs  (i.e.  those  on the  right  of the  distribution):
(13)  di/dp  - (-y/A)(-B(W-S)[aB'(L)  +  07B'(#-S)]  +  [B(  -S) - B(9-S)]c'l)  >  0
The  ambiguity  now  exists  with  respect  to innovations  near  the  lower  end  of the
range:
(14) d/dO  - (7/A)(-B(L-S)[B'(G)  +  yB'(T-S)J  +  [B(Q-S) - B(V-S)]c')
which  can  be positive  if  the  (negative)  term  [B(Q-S)  - B(O-S)]c'  is
sufficiently  large  in  absolute  value. Notice  that [B(Q-S)  - B(O-S)]  is  the
difference  between  Southern  marginal  consumer  benefits  at the  two  ends  of the
innovation  range. The  likelihood  that  increased  patent  protection  in the
South  will lead  to some  of the  products  favored  in  the  North  to drop  out
increases  with: (i)  the  degree  to  which  existing  innovations  mirror  Northern
requirements;  (ii)  the  diffferences  in tastes  between  the  two  regions;  and-12-
(iii)  the  magnitude  of the  cost increase  as the  range  broadens.
Once  again,  irrespective  of  whether  some  innovations  drop  out,  the  range
itself  must  broader;:
(15)  dG/dO - dU/dO
- (7/A)(B(O-S)(caB'  (Q)  +  87B'(Q-S)]  - B(Q-S)([aB'(O)  +  fi7B'(O-S)])  >  0,
but the  presence  of the  South  skews  the  range  to the  right  relative  to  the
mean  of the  B(O)  distribution.
(ili)  Effects  of Change  in  Relative  Market  Sizes. As far  as the  range  of
innovations  is concerned,  the  relative  market-size  parameter  7 enlters  the
model  in  much  the  same  way  that  B does:  an increase  in y,  just  as an increase
in  P,  raises  the  weight  placed  by Northern  firms  on  Southern  tastes.
Therefore,  the  comparative-statics  results  are  much the  same. The  range  of
innovations  broadens  unambiguously  (dO/d7  - dU/d7  >  0),  and  more  of the
potential  innovations  particularly  suited  to  Southern  tastes  are  developed
(dO/d-y  >  0). And some  of the  innovations  at the  other  end  may  drop  out  if
the  term  P[B(O-S)  - B(O-S)]c'  is  sufficiently  negative.
(iv)  Effects  of  Change  in  Tastes. Taste  differences  between  the  two
regions  are  captured  here  by the  parameter  S; the  larger  is  S, the  greater  the
taste  difference.  We  would  expect  that  as S Increases,  the  range  of
innovations  becomes  progressively  more  skewed  away  from  Northern  tastes. This
is indeed  the  case,  as  both  the  lower  and  upper  bound  of the  range
unambiguously  move  to the  right  (i.e.,  di/dS  >  0 and  dO/dS  >  0).  Further,
one  can  show  that  when  'yp<a,  we  must  have  d_/dS  <  1  and  dO/dS  <  1.
What about  the  number  of innovations,  or the  size  of the  range? The
comparative-statics  yield:-13-
(16) d7/dS - dj/dS - (of-y/A)[B'()B'(T-S)  - B'(T)V'(P-S)  ,
(-)  (-)  (-)
whose  sign  looks  ambiguous  at first  sight. With  a symmetric  distribution,
however,  more  can  be said. Remember  that  the  range  of innovaticns  [L, °]
will  generally  be skewed  to the  right  relative  to the  mean  of B(9) (due  to  the
South's  influence).  This  allows  us to  gauge  the  relative  slopes  along  the
distribution  as follows:  IB'(Q)I  > IB'(O)l  and IB'(O-S)i  >  IB'(L-S)I.
Therefore  the  first  term  in  the  square  brackets  dominates  and  the  sign  of the
expression  must  be positive. An increase  in  taste  differences  between  the
North  and  South  widens  the  range  of innovations  that  are  developed.
To  conclude  this  section,  there  is  reason  to think  that  there  will  be
both  cooperative  and  non-cooperative  elements  in  any  North-South  bargain  over
patent  protection.  To some  extent,  patent  protection  in  the  North  and  South
are  substitutes  for  each  other,  as  either  increases  the  incentive  of  Northern
firms  to  engage  in innovative  activity. The  closer  is  1 to  unity,  the  greater
impact  Southern  patent  protection  has on the  profitability  of  Northern
innovation.  But  Northern  and  Southern  patents  are  imertfect  substitutes  for
each  other. Everything  else  being  the  same,  both  regions  would  prefer  to  have
the  range  of innovations  be as  congruent  with  their  tastes  and  requirements  as
possible. Southern  patent  protection,  for  example,  not  only increases  the
range  of innovations,  but also  skews  it  away  from  Northein  preferences.  As  we
shall  see,  this  may  provide  a rationale  for  the  South  to  provide  protection
even  when  the incentives  to free  ride  on  Northern  patents  are  strong.
In the  rest  of the  paper,  the  comparative-statics  results  developed  here
will  play  an important  role. We draw  attention  in  particular  to the-14-
significance  of the  ambiguity  in  the  signs  of de/do  and  dQ/dp. A sufficient
condition  for  the,reaction  curves  of the  two  regions  to  slope  down  in  a Nash
equilibrium  will  be that  dO/da  >  0 and  d_/de  <  0.  We will treat  this  as the
benchmark. But  when dl/do  <  0 and/or  d/d, >  0, one  or both  of the  reaction
curves  could  slope  up. In the  latter  situation,  increased  patent  protection  by
one  region  leads  to the  elimination  of innovations  in the  other  region  that
are  favored  highly  compared  to the  ones  that  are  being  stimulated. In  such
circumstances,  much  of the  conventional  wisdom  can  be reversed.
Since  many  of the  analytical  expressions  we derive  below  are  of ambiguous
sign,  we  will fortify  our  discussion  of the  channels  at work  with a set  of
numerical  simulations.  Our  simulations  assume  that  consumer  preferences  in
the  North  are  distributed  according  to the  standard  normal  distribution,  and
that  the  cost function  is  given  by c(O-Q)  - [exp(l-L)1/2000.  In our  central
case, S  - 1.2 and - - 0.3.  That is, Southern tastes are assumed to be
centered  1.2  standard  deviations  away  from  the  mean  of  Northern  tastes,  and
the  South  is taken  to  represent  a  market  30  percent  as  big as the  North.
(These  values  ensure  that  the  reaction  functions  are  both  negatively  sloped
around  the  Nash  equilibrium.)  We  will  also  refer  to  an alternative  case  with
more  extreme  taste  differences,  where  S  - 2  and y  - 0.12,  in  which  the
Northern  reaction  function  will  be positively  sloped.
IV.  Welfare  Analysis
Suppose  a benevolent  global  dictator  were  to assign  patent  rights  to the
two  regions  in  accordance  with  a  conventional  social  welfare  function. Would
she  impose  egual  rates  of patent  protection?
To begin  with,  let  the  global  welfare  function  (W)  be written  as an-15-
equally-weighted  sum  of  welfare  in  the  two  regions:
(17) W(J, O)  - f(B(O)  +  PjB(O-S)]d0  - [O-  j]c(.)  +  7[(l-P)B(#-S)dD
- B(O)dO  +  |7B(O-S)dO - 1 -§_]c(.).
Since  we ha."e  two  independent  instruments,  a  and  P,  to  control  two  targets,  Q
and  0,  we migiit  as  well assume  that  we can  exercise  direct  control  over  the
range  of innovations.  The  first-order  conditions  with  respect  to  L and  0,
respectively,  are:
(18) B(O)  +  7B(O-S'  - c - [O-Q]c'  - 0,
(19) B(O)  +  7B(i-S)  - c  - [O-Q]c'  - 0,
Setting  (18)  and (19)  equal  to  each  other  yields:
(20)  (B(j)  - B(7)]/[B(7-S)  - B(O-S)]  - 1.
Hence  the  smaller  is r,  the  less  off-center  is  the  range  of innovations
relative  to  Northern  tastes. Putting  (20)  together  with  equation  (9),  we are
left  with the  equality  v - y(O/a),  which  requires  a  - P.  Therefore,  when the
global  welfare  function  is strictly  utilitarian,  global  optimality  does  indeed
require  egjaAl  levels  of  patent  protection  in  the  two  regions. Note  that  this
holds  irrespective  of the  sizes  or tastes  of the  two  regions.
The explanation  is  as follows. Since  we are  maximizing  total  benefits  in
the  North  and  the  South,  the  relative  size  of the  South,  7,  also  represents
the  relative  weight  we place  on its  welfare. But firms  weight  the  two  regions
according  to their  relative  profitability,  which  is  captured  by the  ratio-16-
7(p/a). Firm  behavior  coincides  with  social  optimality  only  when  a  - p.
We can  say  more  about  the  properties  of the  optimal  levels  of patent
protection. Substituting  for  c(.)  from  (5)  and  (6),  we can rewrite  equations
(18)  and (19)  as follows:
(18')  (1-a)B(Q.)  +  (1-p)yB(8-S)  - [G-Ljc'
(19')  (1-a)B(B)  +  (l-p) 7B(e-S)  - [5-L]c'.
When  costs  are  not increasing  in  the  range  of innovations  (c'-O),  the  right-
hand  side  is  zero,  implying  a  - 0  - 1. With constant  costs,  there  are  no
distortions  in the  market,  and  firms  should  be allowed  to capture  the  entire
consumer  surplus. Patent  protection  is  complete. But  when congestion  effects
are  present  (c'>O),  firms  confer  a negative  externality  on each  other. Each
additional  firm  that  enters  drives  up the  costs  of incumbents,  so that  if
patent  protection  were  complete,  there  would  be too  many  firms. In  this  case,
since  the  right-hand  side  of (18')  and  (19')  is  positive,  social  optimality
requires  a - p  <  1.  Patent  protection  is incomplete.
This is,  of course,  a rather  different  story  from  that  commonly  given  as
to  why governments  provide  less  than  full  patent  protection.  The  usual
explanation  has to  do  with  reducing  the  monopoly  power  of firms  to  which
protection  has  been  granted  and  enabling  innovations  to  be readily  diffused
after  a fixed  number  of years. But,  formally,  these  explanations  can  be
reconciled  with  the  present  framework.  We could  presume  for  example  that,  due
to technological  spillovers,  the  research  costs  of each  firm  are  a decreasing
function  of the  quantity  of publicly  available  technology.  As a  and  P
increase,  patents  become  more  restrictive  and  fewer  technologies  remain  in the
public  domain. Therefore,  costs  of all  firms  possibly  increase. 8 This is-17-
quite  similar  to the  effect  that  operates  in  the  present  model.
Now  suppose  that  the  global  dictator  is  also  egalitarian,  and that  she
values  the  poor  South's  welfare  more  than  the  North's. How  would  this  change
the  relationship  between  the  optimal  a  and  P?
Let  the  relative  weight  attached  to the  South's  welfare  be denoted  +,
with  0>1.  Global  welfare  can  now  be written  as
(21)  W(Q, 0) - J[B(O) +  flIB(e-S)]de  - [0 - 2]c(.)  +  |  f(l-P)B(O-S)dO
- fB()de  +  rB(9-S)de  - [0  *]c(.),
where  *  . - (0-l)p]. Note  that  O  >  1 as long  as  P  <  1.  Therefore  the  only
difference  with  the  earlier  objective  function  is  that  now the  gross  benefits
of the  South--gross  in the  sense  that  profit  transfers  to the  North  are  not
included--receives  a  weight  larger  than  one (4). The  analogue  of (20)  now is
(20')  [B(Q)  - B(T)]/FB(W-S) - B(Q-S)]
- - [7(1-a)(p  +  v)fB(0-S)dO]  [B(7-S)  - B(Q-S)]-1,
where  p  A  dp/d9  >  0 and  v - dP/dp  >  0 (see  the  appendix).  Notice  that  since
O  and  Q are  now treated  directly  as policy  variables,  the  two  derivatives  p
and  v refer  to the  implied  changes  in  P  needed  to  bring  about  the  desired
adjustments  in  the  boundaries. (They  are  total  derivatives,  as  a  is  being
8.  More  specifically,  two  effects  can  be identified  as a  and  P  are  raised.
The  first,  which  argues  in  favor  of patents,  is  that  more  research  is
undertaken.  The second,  which  argues  against  patents,  is  that  less  of it
becomes  available  to  all  firms  and  costs  are  not  sufficiently  reduced. When
patent  protection  is  nearly  complete,  a small  decrease  can  have  second-order
effects  in terms  of the  first,  but first-order  effects  in terms  of the  second.
This  would  call  for  incomplete  patent  protection.-18-
endogenously  adjusted  as well.) Putting  this  together  with (9)  and
simplifying,  we get:
(22)  - afn,  with
Q - (l+v(+-l)]-l(#  +  (1-v)(#  +  v)fB(O-S)d6  (B(T-S)  - B(O-S)]- 1).
(+)  ~~(  )  (  M  (+)
Notice  that i  >  1ia(0-1),  so that  the  effect  of the  first  term  in  the  curly
brackets  (i.e.  4)  is  to  raise  8  relative  to  a.  This  comes  from  the  desire  to
skew  the  innovation  range  towards  Southern  tasces. But  as P  increases,  so do
profit  transfers  to the  North,  and  this  effect  is  captured  by the  long  second
term  in the  curly  brackets,  which  is  negative  and  subtracts  from  #.  Whether  a
on the  whole  is  bigger  or smaller  than  unity  cannot  be determined  a  priori.
But  the  closer  are  Southern  preferences  to  Northern  ones,  the  greater  the
likelihood  that  0 will  be less  than  one,  and  that  i  will  fall  short  of  o.
This  can  be seen  from  (22):  [B(O-S)  - B(Q-S)]  becomes  smaller  (and  hence  its
inverse  larger)  as S  goes  to zero  (see [9]).9  As Northern  and  Southern
preferences  become  more  alike,  then,  the  free-riding  motive  of the  South
exerts  a growing  influence. But  when  Southern  preferences  for  technology
differ  substantially  from  those  of the  North,  the  globally  optimal  8  could
well  exceed  a.
While  the  theoretical  possibilities  are  unconstrained,  numerical
simulations  with the  specification  described  above  yield  the  result  that  as  X
increases,  Northern  protection  is  consistently  raised  while  Southern
9.  There  is  of course  nothing  here that  would  stop  X  from  turning  negative.
A planner  who  values  the  South's  welfare  sufficiently  will in this  case  try  to
enrich  that  region  by engineering  reverse  profit  transfers  from  the  North,
while  raising  a  to  offset  the  adverse  incentives  on Northern  R&D.  It  may  be
natural  to  think  of  P  as being  bound  below  by 0.-19-
protection  is reduced. These  results  are  diplayed  in  Table  1.  With
sufficiently  large  *.  the  global  planner  would  allow  the  South  to  have a
complete  free-ride.
Therefore,  when the  global  planner  places  more  weight  on the  welfare  of
the  South,  there  is  no longer  any  reason  to  equate  a  and  P.  But,  unlike  what
may  have  been expected,  there  is  no general  reason  to let  the  South  provide
lower  levels  of patent  protection  either. The  planner  has to  trade  off the
free-riding  benefits  to the  South  against  the  losses  urising  from  reduced
levels  of investment  in technologies  that  are  particularly  appropriate  to  poor
countries.
V. The  Nash  Eguilibrium
In the  enviroment  described  above,  patent  protection  in  each  block
affects  welfare  in the  other  block. The  questions  we pose  next  are:  what sort
of  patent  laws  emerge  in the  North  and in  the  South  if  each  region  reacts  to
the  other  region's  patent  laws  by optimizing  over  the  level  of patent
protection  in its  own  market? How  is this  equilibrium  affected  by the  size
and  the  taste  preferences  of the  South? And  how  does  it compare  with the
Pareto-optimal  patent  protection  administered  by a  benevolent  dictator?  To
answer  these  questions,  we first  develop  the  players'  reaction  functions  under
the  assumption  of  Nash  behavior.
(i)  The  Northern  reaction  function. The  Northern  planner  choses  a to
maximize  social  welfare  (7),  taking  0  as given. Optimally,  the  marginal  cost
of  protection  is  set  equal  to the  margirnal  benefit. We differentiate  (7)  with
respect  to  a, rearrange  using  (5)  and (6)  and  set  equal  to zero:-20-
(23) Wn  - (l-a)[B(9)Oa  - B(2.)2.  - c'  f-t1,-fal  - 0,
where  we have introduced  the  following  notation:  °a  - dO/da,  fa a  dj/da,
etc.  The  second  term  of (23)  represents  the  positive  marginal  cost  of
increased  protection,  an expression  that  is  proportional  to the  size  of the
innovation  range  ([-L]  and  to the  positive  effect  of  a on the  range
The  first  term  represents  the  net  marginal  benefit  that  accrues  on both  sides
of the  range,  and it  is  only (1-a)  times  the  marginal  consumer  surplus  (the
term  in  brackets)  because  a proportion  a of the  increase  in consumer  surplus
is dissipated  in  research  costs  by the  marginal  innovating  firms. (Remember
that  zero-profit  conditions  hold  at the  edges  of the  ra:age.)  The  marginal
gain  in  consumer  surplus  due  to an expansion  of the  range  of innovations  is
composed  of two  effects: he lower  range  necessarily  expands  (to  the  left)
after  an increase  in  a, thus  increasing  welfare.  The  upper  range  generally
also  expands  (to  the  right)  as firms  can  spread  their  co.-t  on a larger  base.
But,  as discussed  in  section  III,  because  costs  increase  with  the  range  of
innovations,  it is  possible  that  the  upper  range  retracts  (to  the  left).
Let  a  stand  for  the  North's  optimal  patent. When  costs  are  not  rising
(c'-O),  (23)  is always  positive  for  a<l,  implying  that  a  *-.  This  would  be
the  case  where  there  are  no congestion  effects  in  R&D.  But  with  costs
increasing  with the  range  of research  activity,  a  *<1 since  at o-l,  the
expression  in (23)  is  negative.  Moreover,  when  P-O,  a  is strictly  positive,
since  at a-0,  i-B  and  the  second  term  of (23)  is  zero  while  the  first  is
positive.
How  does  the  North  react  to an increase  in  protection  in the  South? In
general,  but  not always,  the  North  will  reduce  protection  in  response,  due  to
two  considerations:  (i)  at  the  margin  the  positive  effect  of  Northern
protection  on own  welfare  is  attenuated,  and (ii)  research  costs  are increased-21-
as a result  of  higher  P.  The  ambiguity  noted  above  with  respect  to the  signs
of 5 and  QP,  however,  imply  that  effect  (i)  does  not  a. ays  obtain,  such
that  a decrease  in  a  is sometimes  _jdesirable.  To see  that,  apply  the
implicit  function  theorem  to (23)  to get:
(2)da*/dp - -wnp / Wan (24)  Wa  a
where  the  denominator  wn  is  negative  by the  second  order  condition.  Hence,
the  slope  of tne  reaction  function  in (24)  has the  same  sign  as the  numerator
Wn . In  order  to evaluate  the  sign  of Wn  we drop  the  terms  corresponding
to second derivatives of P  and 7,10 on the assumption that these are likely
to  be of second-order  impt-rtance.  Wn  is  then  given  by:
(25)  Wn  - (1-a)[B'(6)e 0 e#  - B'(#)4iQ] - (c'+c'(8-V]fBa-2a][9p-Q]
where  the  first  term  captures  effect  (i)  and  the  second  captures  effect  (ii)
mentioned  above. Expression  (25)  is  negative  in  general,  and  positive  only
when  9  is  negative  and  large  and/or %  is  positive  and  large.
The  interpretation  is  as follows. In general,  as the  range  of
innovations  widens,  the  marginal  benefit  of innovation  drops  on  both sides  of
the  range,  discouraging  protection.  In this  case,  both tris  effect  and the
rising  R&D costs  contribute  to  a lessening  of Northern  ptntection.  But  when
tastes  are  very different  and  a  and  P  are  far  apart,  increased  Southern
protection  can  enhance  marginal  benefits  of an increase  in  a.  This  can  occur
in  two  types  of situations:  when  OQ>0  and  large,  an increase  in  8  shifts  the
range  away  from  Northern  preferences  and  increased  Northern  protection  can
10.  In other words we assume  - f  - o  a - -a  - 0.  This is somewhat
analogous  to the  assumption  of linear  demand  curves  in standard  oligopoly
theory. We maintain  this  assumption  throughout  the  paper.-22-
increase  marginal  revenue  by recapturing  the  valuable  technologies  that  would
be lost  otherwise.  And  when 9a<O  and  large  enough,  a reduction  in  a  hurts  the
North  by leading  to the  substitution  of too  many  less  valuable  innovations  on
the  upper  side  of the  range.  In these  cases,  the  positive  effect  on  marginal
revenue  can  overtake  the  negative  effect  on marginal  costs  and it  is  possible
that  an increase  in  P  will  be met  with  an increase  in  a* as the  North  attempts
to shift  the  range  of technologies  away  from  Southern  preferences.
The  more  general  case is  clearest  when  North-South  tastes  coincide  (i.e
S-0).  In this  case,  it is  possible  to  show (see  the  appendix)  that  the
Northern  reaction  function  becomes  linear  in  Southern  protection  and  that  it
is  unambiguously  downard  sloping.  In  particular,  we get:
(26) da*/dP  - - 1/'y  <  0  (at  S-0).
(ii)  The  Southern  reaction  function. Similarly,  we can  derive  the  first-
order  condition  for  the  Southern  planner  and  the  reaction  function  with
respect  to  Northern  protection.  The  problem  is  quite  similar  to the  Northern
problem,  with the  difference  that  the  cost  of increased  protection  is an
increased  transfer  to foreigners  rather  than  an increased  cost  of research.
Differentiating  (8)  with  respect  to  0  and  setting  to zero,  we have (assuming
an interior  solution  for  P):
(27) Ws - 7(l-P)[B(9-S)9p  - B(Q-S)  Xp]  - vfB(O-S)dO  - 0
The second  term  represents  the  marginal  cost  of increased  protection  in  terms
of  higher  payments  to  the  innovating  foreign  firms.  If there  were  no
offsetting  positive  effect  to Southern  patent  protection,  P  would  of  course
be optimally  set  to its  lowest  possible  level  as the  South  would  simply  free
ride  on Northern  innovations.  However,  there  are in  general  gains  associated-23-
with  protection  and  they  are  represented  by the  first  term  in  equation  (27).
An increase  in  p  increases  the  range  of innovations  and tilts  it towards
Southern  tastes. 11 Note  that  the  first  term  gets  smaller  with  8,  since  only
(1-P)  of the  consumer  surplus  is  captured  by the  South.  In particular,  the
marginal  benefit  of protection  is  zero  at 6-1  and  therefore,  6  is  necessarily
smaller  than  1. Finally,  note  that  P* can  be zero  in  general  but that  it  is
certainly  positive  when  a-0.  (This  is  because  Ws > 0,  when  a  - - 0.)
The slope  of the  Southern  reaction  function  is  given  by:
(28) df*/do  - - W8p /  Wp
which--because  the  denominator  is  negative--has  the  same  sign  as  the
numerator.  Ignoring  again  the  second  order  terms  in  P. and  0,  Ws  is  given
by:
(29) Wsp  - (l-P)(B'(W-S) 9 aO  - B'(j-S)  PO]  - rB(-S)7 0 - B(Q-S)L4]
which  is  negative  when 92>0  and/or  i.<0.  However,  (29)  could  be positive  and
it  might  be in  the interests  of the  the  South  to  react  to stiffer  Northern
protection  by increasing  its  own  protection.  This  would  occur  when:  (i)
increased  Northern  protection  shifts  the  range  of innovations  sufficiently
away  from  Southern  tastes  (0a<O  and  large);  and  when (ii)  at the  margin,  a
reduction  in Southern  protection  would  add  on too  many innovations  on the
less-valuable  lower  end  of the  range  (Q>0 and  large). Both  situations  are
more likely  to  occur  when  North-South  preferences  are  quite  different. Again
it is  possible  to  show  that  with  similar  tastes  (S-0):
11.  The  degree  to  which  it  does that  depends,  of course,  in  part  on the
relative  size  of the  Southern  market,  y  (see  section  III).-24-
(30) dp*/do  - -<  0  (at  S-0).
(See  the  appendix.)
(iii)  ComRarative  statics. When the  Nash  game  described  above  is  played,
several  types  of equilibria  may  emerge,  with  both reaction  functions  sloping
down,  one  of the  reaction  functions  sloping  up,  or even  both reaction
functions  sloping  up.  Here  we will  focus  on small  changes  around  equilibria
in  which  both reaction  functions  slope  down,  presumably  the  case  that  best
describes  the  current  situation. Even  in this  case,  however,  a range  of
different  comparative  statics  results  are  possible.
(iiia)  The  effect  of taste  differences.  When  North-South  preferences  get
closer,  both  regions  react  by altering  their  levels  of  protection.  There  are
several  effects  at play  here  and  the  global  effect  of a change  in tastes
cannot  be completely  determined. In  order  to  describe  the  channels  through
which  relative  preferences  affect  the  final  outcome,  use  the  implicit  function
theorem  on (23)  and (27)  to  get:
(31)  aa*aS  - - W_  /  Wn  w,
(32) a#*/aS  =  - /  W  -
These  determine  the  direction  of shifts  in the  respective  reaction  functions.
In  both  eqations,  the  expressions  have  the  same  sign  as their  numerators  since
the  denominators  are  negative  when the  second-order  conditions  of the
maximization  problems  are  satisfied.  The  numerators  a.e  respectively  given  by:
(33) Wa  - (l-a)[B'(6)8aOS  - B'(D)alaS]  -
(34)  WS  - 7(1-f)[B'(9-S)(TS-l)To  - B'Q-S)(fS-1)  P]
- 7[B(T-S) 5S - B(O-S)OS  - fB'(6-S)d6].
Let  us first  consider  the  effects  of taste  differences  on Southern-25-
optimal  protection.  As North-South  preferences  get  closer  (i.e.  S decreases),
the  South  is affected  through  two  channels,  both  of  which  generally  discourage
patent  protection. (i)  First,  for  a given  level  of  protection,  what  must  be
paid  to the  foreign  innovators  increases  as S decreases.  This  marginal  cost
effect  is  captured  by the  second  term  in (34):  since  protection  becomes  in a
sense  more  expensive,  there  are incentives  to  decrease  it.  In effect,  as the
South  becomes  more  similar  to the  North,  its  tax  base  becomes  larger  because
the  existing  technologies--which  are  biased  towards  Northern  tastes--now
produce  a  higher  consumer  surplus. 12 (ii)  Second,  the  marginal  benefit  of
innovations  at the  ends  of the  range  generally  decrease.  This is  captured  by
the  positive  sign  of the  first  term  in (34).  To see  why,  first  remember  that
the  range  of innovations  gets  smaller,  and  that  it  shifts  to the  left  by less
than  the  shift  in  Southern  preferences  because  the  reduction  in research  costs
associated  with  the  smaller  range  forces  the  marginal  firms  (at  the  ends  oi
the  range)  to service  thinner  markets.  As a result,  marginal  welfare  gets
smaller  at 0, and  higher  at  Q. Since  in general  the  first  effect  dominates,
optimal  Southern  protection  will  tend  to  decline.
As tastes  get  closer,  the  North  is  also  affected  through  two  channels.
(i)  First,  the  range  of innovations  necessarily  shrinks,  reducing  the  fixed
cost  of innovation  for  all  technologies.  This  effect--captured  by the  second
term  in (33)--encourages  the  North  to increase  innovation  in its  most  prefered
technologies  and  this  is  achieved  with  highler  protection. (ii)  The  other
effect--represented  by the  first  term  in  brackets--captures  the  change  in
12.  To illustrate  that,  imagine  that  India  and  Brazil  have  similar  rates  of
patent  protection,  but  that  Brazilian  technological  needs  are  closer  to those
of the  North  than  is the  case  for  India.  Then the  above  considerations  state
that,  given  Northern  influences  on the  existing  range  of technologies,  a
representative  consumer  in  Brazil  would  have a larger  consumer  surplus  and
would  be paying  larger  royalties  to foreign  firms.-26-
marginal  welfare  at the  ends  of the  innovation  range,  and  on  net  exerts  a
depressing  effect  on domestic  patent  protection:  the  lower  end  of the  range
widens  (L decreases)  allowing  the  North  to capture  new  technologies  that  are
less  valuable  at the  margin.  This  reduces  the  need  for  patent  protection  as,
in  effect,  the  marginal  productivity  of protection  falls.  On the  other  hand,
the  upper  end  of the  range  retracts,  increasing  the  marginal  benefits  at  1.13
This  effect  tends  to encourage  increased  protection,  but it is in  general
smaller  than  the  depressing  effect  at the  lower  end  of the  innovation  range
(unless  OS is  much  larger  than  LS)-  In  sum,  both  the  marginal  cost  and  the
marginal  benefit  of  protection  are  reduced  and  the  reaction  of the  North  will
depend  on the  relative  importance  of these  effects.
Figure  2 illustrates  the  possible  outcomes  when S incrsases. 1 4 As North-
South  preferences  get  further  apart,  the  Southern  reaction  function  shifts  up
while  the  Northern  reaction  function  can  either  increase  or decrease. The  new
equilibrium  is  either  at  a point  like  B or C,  with  higher  0  but ambiguous
results  in  the  North,  or at  a point  like  D  with  higher  a  but lower  P.  The
only  general  conclusion  that  can  be drawn  when  both  reaction  functions  are
downward  sloping  is that  at least  one  of the  two  regions  must  increase  its
protection  when S gets  larger. (Conversely,  either  a  or P  must  fall  when S
gets  smaller.) In our  simulations  we find  that  P  is  generally  increased  while
a  is  fairly  insensitive  (decreasing  slightly  at first,  but then  increasing)  as
S  becomes  larger  (see  Table  2).  Table  2  also  diplays  the  possibility  that  the
South  may  choose  higher  levels  of  protection  than  the  North  if  the  taste
13.  Note  that  this  effect  goes  the  other  way  when 5  <  0.
14.  This  is  drawn  for  the  stable  case  where  the  South's  reaction  function  is
more  steeply  sloped  than  the  North's.-27-
differences  become  pronounced  enough.
(iiib)  Changes  in  relative  market  size. A change  in the  relative  size  of
the  Southern  market  also  has  ambiguous  effects  on the  equilibrium  strategies
when  both reaction  functions  slope  down. It is  easy to  verify  that  in  that
case
aa*la,  - W  /  W  / wn  n  Wn  < 0,
a,9/a,  - - w  s
-0((l.P)[B'(Q-S)2P 2 - B'(9-S)7P 2] +  [B(Q-S)iP  - B(0-S)7O])/W^;  <  0
In  words,  the  reactions  functions  of  both  regions  shift  back  when 7 increases.
Hence,  the  level  of  patent  protection  must  decline  in  at least  one  of the  two
regions. This implies  that,  somewhat  paradoxically,  an increase  in the  size
of the  South  can lead  to reduced  protection  in  both  the  North  and  the  South.
From  the  North's  perspective,  as the  Southern  market  enlarges  the  range  of
innovation  widens  beyond  the  most  desirable  level  and  it  may  make sense  to
reduce  (costly)  protection.  But  the  South  may  have  been expected  to  always
increase  0,  as the  costs  of free  riding  now  apparently  become  larger. This is
not  so  because  an increase  in -t  also  increases  the  benefits  of free  riding,  as
the  profit  transfers  at the  margin  increase  commensurately--see  the  South's
first-order  condition  (27). Moreover,  since  7  and i  are  substitutes  for  each
other  in  determining  the  technology  range,  it  may  be rational  for  the  South  to
use  the  extra  leverage  provided  by the  increase  in its  market  size  to  reduce
profit  transfers  to the  North  (via  a reduction  in  f).
Table  3 shows  some  simulation  outcomes  for  the  benchmark  case. These  are
generally  in  line  with  conventional  wisdom. As y  is  reduced,  the  South
progressively  reduces  0,  and  eventually  stops  protection  altogether.
(iv)  The inefficiency  of the  Nash  equilibrium.  We end  by demonstrating
that  the  Nash  equilibrium  is inefficient  from  the  global  standpoint.  This is-28-
natural,  given  the  spillovers  involved. Protection  in  any  one  region  profits
the  other  region  (when  reaction  functions  are  downward  sloping). Since
neither  side  takes  into  account  these  spillovers,  there  is  likely  to  be too
little  innovation.  However,  other  possible  effects  go the  other  way: in
particular,  with  a and  P  different  enough,  wasteful  competition  sets  in,  and
may  lead  to too  much  protection  in  both  blocks.
To illustrate  the  effects  at  work,  we evaluate  the  marginal  (equally-
weighted)  welfare  of our  benevolent  global  dictator  at the  Nash  equilibrium.
Differentiating  (17)  with  respect  to  a and  then  6,  we  have:
(35)  W0 - [B(O)  +  7B(T-S)  - c - (O)c'1  p
+  [-B(Q) - 7B(O-S) +  c +  (T-O)c']Q
(36)  Wa - [B(°)  +  IB(T-S) - c - (O)c'  ]°a
+  [-B(Q) - 7B(O-S) +  c +  (T-O)c']4.
To evaluate  (36)  at the  Nash  equilibrium,  we plug  in (23).  Then,  provided  that
7-> 0 (which  is  a sufficient  but  not  necessary  condition),  the  resulting
expression  can  be shown  to  be positive  for  all  #<1, including *  of the  Nash
equilibrium:
(37) Wa - [aB(0)  +  7B(T-S) - c]98 - [aB(Q)  +  7B(O-S) - c]9a.
The  expressions  in the  square  brackets  are  positive  from  the  zero-profit
conditions  (5)-(6). Thus,  the  North  is  generally  underpatented  from  a  world
welfare  point  of  view.  The  reason  for  that  is simply  that  the  Northern
decision  makers  do not  take  into  account  the  positive  externality  that
innovations  produce  in  the  South.  Note  that  when P-1, (37)  is  equal  to zero
(using  [5]  and [6]).  Only  in this  limiting  case is  the  Northern  patent  optimal
from  a global  point  of  view.
But  it  may  be possible  for  the  North  to  be overpatented.  This  can  occur-29-
when  70<O  and  large. In this  case,  there  is  wasteful  competition  in
protection  as the  North  would  be trying  to shift  the  range  of innovations
towards  its  most  preferred  technologies.
The  analysis  is  quite  similar  for  the  South.  To  eva'Luate  (35)  at the  Nash
equilibrium,  plug in (23)  and (27),  and  rearrange  to get:
(38) W  - (1-a)[B(1)0 - B(+)4][(Op/5a)  - (  /4)]  7  vfB(9-S)dO.
which  is  generally  positive  (when  9960  and  4  <O).  Thus,  in general,  the  South
is  underprotected  because  it ignores  the  positive  effect  of  protection  on
Northern  welfare.  In  particular,  it is  easy  to  verify  that  at S-0  (38)  is
unambiguously  positive. However  it  is  once  again  possible  that  the  South  will
be overprotected  when  90  and/or  4<0.
VI.  Concluding  Remarks
WThile  the  model  analyzed  here is  quite  simple,  it leads  to  a rich  array
of comparative-statics  results,  some  of  which  may  appear  counter-intuitive  at
first  sight. This is  largely  due  to  our  emphasis  on the  dimension  of
technological  choice:  some  of the  usual  free-riding  considerations  have  to  be
qualified  when  we take  into  account  the  possibility  that  patent  laws  in the
two  regions  affect  not  only  the  quantity  of innovation,  but  also  its  quality.
This  becomes  important  when  the  two  regions  have  differing  technological
needs. On the  other  hand,  when the  two  regions  are  identical  in  preferences,
the  usual  conclusions  can  be recovered.
The  analysis  leads  to  several  results,  some  of  which  can  be listed  as
follows. First,  an increase  in  patent  protection  in  any  of the  two  regions
leads  to  an increase  in  innovative  activity,  as  well  as a greater  fit  between
the  available  technologies  and  the  preferences  of the  patenting  region. By
implication,  this  skews  the  technology  range  away  from  the  needs  of the  other-30-
region. Second,  while  a strictly  utilitarian  global  welfare  function  would
assign  identical  rates  of  patent  protection  to the  North  and  South,  placing
greater  weight  on the  welfare  of the  South  necessitates  differential
treatment.  But it is  not  clear  A 2ior.i  whether  the  South  ought  to  have  a
lower  or  higher  level  of  protection  than  the  North. Third,  when  patent  rules
are  set in  an  uncoordinated  manner,  it  is  possible  that  a narrowing  of .he  gap
between  the  technological  preferences  of the  two  regions  will  lead  to lower
rates  of patent  protection  in the  North  and  the  South. Similarly,  an increase
in the  relative  market  size  of the  South  can  lead  to a reduction  in  patent
protection  in  both regions.-31-
APPENDIX
(a) We start  by derlving  the  comparative  statics  properties  of equations  (5)
and (6),  when the  endogenous  variables  are  O  and  Q_.  Total  differentiation
yields:
[  aB'(9) +  8 7B'($-S)  +  c'  -C'  d. 1
c  0  IaB'(7)  +  P7B'(9-S) - c'  FOJ
[ -B(t)da  - yB(t-S)dfi  - #B(Q-S)d7  +  $rB'(2.-S)dS
-B(V)da - 7B(9-S)d8  - #B(7-S)dy +  P7B'(1-S)dS
The  determinant  of the  system,  denoted  by  A,  is  negative.
(b)  Consider next the alte-native wherein a  and a  are treated as endogenous,
targeted  on specific  O  and  Q_.  Notice  that  da/dO,  for  example,  is  not  simply
the  inverse  of dl/da  as  different  variables  are  being  held  constant  in  each
case;  in  the  first  case,  6  is  free  to  vary  but  P.  is  parametric;  in the  latter,
O  adjusts  endogenously  while  8  is  held fixed. The  system  now  looks  like:
I  -B(Q)  -7B(j-S)  ][da]  [aB'(P-)  +  07B'(#-S)  +  c'ld2.  - c'dO
-B(i)  -7B(9-S) Jldo  lc'dQ +  [foB'()  + p7B'(V-S) - c']d  I
The  determinant  of the  system  is  positive  since  B(O-S)  >  B(7)  and  B(Q.)  >
B(d-S). It  can  be shown  therefore  that (p  +  v)  - (d/dO +  dP/df)  is
unambiguously  positive.
(c) The second-order  conditions  for  the  Northern  and  the  Southern
maximization  prob'lems  are  respectively:
(Al) Wn  a2 - B'(Q)42]  (O  -4)[c'  +  c."(9-d)]  <  0.
(A2) W-s  - ir(l-P)[B'(7-S)9p 2 - B'(Q-S)  p 2] - 2'y[B(9-S)9p  - B(Q-S).p  1,-32-
which  is  necessarily  negative  when  Q<O.  Otherwise,  it  is  possible  that  (A2)
will  be positive,  implying  that  p8  goes  to the  corner  solution  8*-O.
(d) Using  (10),  (11),  (13)  and (14),  it is  easy  to  verify  that  when  S-O:
,6 - #;  Oa  - S;  °S  - -QS;  y°a  - 6p; and B'(0) - -B'(Q).  Plugging
those  relationships  into  (25),  (29),  (Al)  and (A2),  (24)  reduces  to (26),
and (28)  becomes  (30).  In  general,  a  Nash  equilibrium  does  not  exist  in this
case,  as  both  reaction  functions  have the  same  slope.-33-
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Table  1:  Globally  Optimal  Patent  Rates
central  casea:  extreme  taste  diffb:
p.  p
1.0  0.21  0.21  0.21  0.21
1.5  0.31  0.05  0.28  0.10
5.0  0.78  0.00  0.70  0.00
Notes:  a S-1.2;  r-0.30.  b S-2;  7-0.12.
Table  2:  Nash Equilibrium  Solutions
S  a
a. central  casa:
0.8  0.22  0.00
1.1  0.22  0.00
13  0.201  0.07
1.3  0.20  0.07
1.4  0.20  0.10
1.5  0.20  0.14
1.6  0.21  0.15
b. extreme  taLste  diffb:
1.0  0.22  0.00
1.8  0.23  0.00
2L2  QIIQ  QOA
2.2  0.20  0.26
2.5  0.23  0.38
Notes:  a S-1.2;  7-0.30.  bS-2;  7-0.12.-35-
Table 3:  Nash Equilibrium Solutions
If  a  a
central casea:
0.50  0.20  0.08
0.40  0.20  0.07
0.30  0.21  0.03
0.25  0.21  0.03
0.20  0.21  0.00
Note: a S-1.2; 7-0.30.- %(6
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